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PROBING RACIAL PREJUDICE ON VOIR
DIRE: THE SUPREME COURT
PROVIDES ILLUSORY JUSTICE
FOR MINORITY DEFENDANTS
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1629 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rosales-Lopez v. United States,I the Supreme Court in a plurality
opinion2 held that a trial judge's refusal to question prospective jurors
about possible ethnic or racial prejudice toward Mexicans, where the
defendant was of Mexican descent and specifically requested such in-
quiries, did not constitute reversible error given the circumstances of the
case.3 In so holding, the Court articulated a standard which not only
erodes a minority defendant's right to an impartial trial, but also fails to
provide federal trial judges adequate guidance as to when such inquiries
are required. Furthermore, as Justice Stevens' vigorous dissenting opin-
ion points but,4 the Court's rejection of a per se rule requiring such in-
quiries when requested by a minority defendant interprets incorrectly
the primary precedent, Aldridge v. United States.5
Instead of a per se rule, the plurality established a standard for fed-
eral courts6 requiring voir dire inquiries about racial prejudice only
where the circumstances of a case create a "reasonable possibility" that
such prejudice might influence a jury.7 Thus, courts must inquire about
racial prejudice only where 1) the circumstances of a case involve a vio-
lent crime, and the defendant and the victim are of different racial or
1 101 S. Ct. 1629 (1981).
2 Justice White delivered the Court's opinion, in which Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and
Powell joined. Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Chief justice Burger, filed an opinion
concurring in the result. justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined.
3 101 S. Ct. at 1637.
4 Id. at 1640-41. See text accompanying notes 63-68 infa.
5 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
6 The Court reasoned that since racial prejudice was not bound up in the conduct of the
Rosales-Lopez trial, there was no constitutional requirement for such voir dire. 101 S. Ct. at
1635-1636. The Court could require more of federal courts, however, through its supervisory
authority.
7 Id. at 1636.
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ethnic groups,8 or 2) the total circumstances of a case create a "reason-
able possibility" of racial prejudice.9 Unfortunately, the plurality's stan-
dard fails to address the risk that a juror may harbor racial prejudice for
reasons unrelated to the circumstances of a case. By depriving a minor-
ity defendant of the opportunity to probe for racial prejudice during
voir dire, a court may select prejudiced jurors and thus deny him an
impartial trial. Moreover, the "reasonable possibility" standard, which
instructs the trial court to weigh intuitively the total circumstances of a
case, affords trial courts little guidance.
The per se rule advocated by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opin-
ion is preferable to the plurality's "reasonable possibility" standard.
Only a per se rule would assure a minority defendant of the chance to
uncover racial prejudices which are held for irrational reasons.' 0 A per
se rule would also provide trial courts with a clearer standard to apply.
Hence, the dissenting view is persuasive not only under the circum-
stances of Rosales-Lopez, but also in any federal criminal trial of a minor-
ity defendant.
A jury in the District Court for the Southern District of California
convicted Humberto Rosales-Lopez of participating in a plan by which
three Mexican aliens illegally entered the United States.'" At his trial,
Rosales-Lopez did not testify but instead chose to challenge the credibil-
ity of the Government's witnesses: the Immigration and Naturalization
Service agents who arrested him; the three aliens; David Falcon-Zavala,
8 Id. While Justice Rehnquist concurred in the plurality opinion's result, he rejected the
first part of the two-part "reasonable possibility" rule because of its 'per se" aspect. Id. at
1637.
9 Id. at 1636. The trial court's evaluation of the total circumstances would be subject to
case-by-case review by the appellate courts.
10 Id. at 1638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I I The defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to conceal, harbor and shield,
and illegally transport aliens, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 8 U.S.C. § 1324; three
counts of aiding and abetting the illegal transportation of aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C.'
§ 1324(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and three counts of concealing, harboring and shielding
aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3).
The Government's evidence at trial revealed that three aliens crossed the Mexican-
American border on the night of December 10, 1978. Their guide took them to a car, which
had been left for them on the American side, and drove them to the home of Mrs. Virginia
Bowling in Imperial Beach, California, about eight miles inside the border. Rosales-Lopez,
who had been living with Mrs. Bowling's nineteen-year-old daughter in her mother's house
since July, 1978, 'let them into the garage of the house. Mrs. Bowling was an American,
apparently Caucasian.
In the morning, Rosales-Lopez hid the three aliens and their guide in the trunk of an
Oldsmobile, which Mrs. Bowling drove north, through the San Clemente checkpoint.
Rosales-Lopez followed in another car, and after passing through the checkpoint, exchanged
cars with Mrs. Bowling. While she drove back to Imperial Beach, he continued toward Los
Angeles where he took the aliens and their guide to an apartment. Agents of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service who had the apartment under surveillance arrested Rosales-Lo-
pez when he left the apartment with one of the aliens.
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another named smuggling principal who was arrested with Rosales-Lo-
pez; and Mrs. Virginia Bowling, who also participated in the plan.12
Prior to the trial, defense counsel moved for permission to person-
ally voir dire prospective jury members. At the same time, he filed a list
of twenty-six questions which he requested the trial judge to pose if the
court denied the first motion. The trial judge chose to conduct the voir
dire himself, as permitted by Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure and as is the practice in the Southern District of
California.
The judge asked general questions of the veniremen as a group,' 3
and about half of the questions submitted by defense counsel. He did
not ask the submitted question: "Would you consider the race or Mexi-
can descent of Humberto Rosales-Lopez in your evaluation of this case?
How would it affect you?' 4 He did, however, ask one of defense con-
sel's questions about aliens, which he rephrased as: "Do any of you have
any particular feelings one way or the other about aliens, or could you
sit as a fair and impartial juror if you are called upon to do so?"15 The
court excused two prospective jurors based upon their responses to the
question. 16 The voir dire ended with the question: "Does any reason
occur to any one of you why you could not sit in this case as a fair and
impartial juror, any reason whatsoever?"' 7
After the voir dire, defense counsel reiterated his request that sev-
eral of the submitted but unasked questions be posed to the panel. He
argued that the court must pose the question regarding racial prejudice
since a federal court "must explore all racial antagonism against my
client because he happens to be of Mexican descent,""' citing Aldridge v.
United States '9 as authority. The trial judge denied the request.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court's
refusal to ask a voir dire question directed toward possible racial
12 See note I I supra.
13 The judge prefaced the voir dire by explaining to the panel: "In order that this defend-
ant shall have a fair and impartial jury to try the charges against him, it is necessary that we
address certain questions to the panel to make sure that there are no underlying prejudices,
there are no underlying reasons why you can't sit as a fair and impartial juror if chosen to do
so in this case." 101 S. Ct. at 1633. The general questions involved: knowledge of the partici-
pants in the trial; outside knowledge of the case; physical impairments that would interfere
with their responsibilities as jurors; legal training; and possible disagreement with the princi-
pie that a criminal defendant is presumed to be innocent. Each juror was also required to
state his/her name, occupation, and spouse's occupation. Id. at 1632-33 n.2.
14 Id. at 1632.
15 Id. at 1633.
16 Id. at 1633 n.3.
17 Id. at 1633.
18 Id.
19 283 U.S. 308.
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prejudice.20 The Ninth Circuit analyzed the voir dire request according
to the "special circumstances" rule, which requires a trial judge to pose
such an inquiry only if there is some indication that the case is likely to
have racial overtones. 21 The Court found no "special circumstances" to
indicate that the defendant's race would be a factor in the trial.22
II. BACKGROUND OF APPLICABLE LAW
The right to trial by an impartial jury is a fundamental element of
American justice.23 The Constitution protects the right to a "speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury"24 in all criminal cases. Moreover,
"[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process...
quite separate from the right to any particular form of proceeding. '25
Voir dire is essential to securing an impartial jury. By subjecting a
panel of prospective jurors to oral examination, a trial court seeks to
identify and excuse those who demonstrate bias or preconceptions which
would preclude an impartial decision.26 Each party in a trial may chal-
lenge veniremen for cause based upon the voir dire responses. Even
when the responses do not support a party's challenge for cause, they
may help that party to decide against which jurors to exercise peremp-
tory challenges. 27 The extent of the voir dire examination is therefore
critical to the final composition of the jury since voir dire is the only
method for a court and for the parties to ascertain the state of mind of
each prospective juror.28
Since racial prejudice among jurors could deprive a minority de-
fendant of a fair trial,29 defense counsel may understandably wish to
20 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 617 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1980).
21 Several of the circuits also followed this "special circumstances" rule. See United States
v. Polk, 550 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 838 (1977); United States v. Floyd, 535
F.2d 1299 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dnied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976); United States v. Perez-Martinez, 525
F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1975). Most of the circuits, however, followed a per se rule requiring a
federal judge to inquire into possible racial prejudice if requested to do so by a minority
defendant in a criminal trial, or face reversal upon appeal. See United States v. Williams, 612
F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979), cert dnied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d
970 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Booker, 480 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971);
Frasier v. United States, 267 F.2d 62 (1st Cir. 1959).
22 617 F.2d at 1354.
23 See Mima Queen and Child v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (Cranch) 290 (1813).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972).
26 See Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimwm Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptoy
Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493 (1975).
27 Id. The author stresses that voir dire is more useful for peremptory challenges than for
challenges for cause. Id. at 1504-07.
28 See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Stury, 38 S. CAL. L RaV. 503 (1965).
29 Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on Voir Dire: ConstitutionalRequirements and Poliy Considera-
lions, 54 B.U. L. REv., 394, 404 (1974).
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probe for such bias during voir dire. In Aldridge v. United States, 30 the
Supreme Court established the right of a black defendant, charged with
the murder of a white policeman, to have prospective jurors questioned
about possible racial prejudice. The trial judge, who conducted the voir
dire personally, denied defense counsel's request that the judge ask the
panel a question regarding racial prejudice.3' Chief Justice Hughes,
writing for the Court, found that the "essential demands of fairness"
required an inquiry into possible racial prejudice under the circum-
stances of the case.32 The Aldridge decision cited numerous state cases33
to support its result, yet it did not explicitly mention any constitutional
basis for its holding.
Two Supreme Court rulings, Ham v. South Carolina34 in 1973 and
Ristaino v. Ross 35 in 1976, delineated the contemporary stature of Al-
dridge. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Ham majority, noted that Al-
dridge was "not expressly grounded upon any constitutional
requirement, ' 36 yet "[t]he inquiry as to racial prejudice derives its con-
stitutional stature from the firmly established precedent of Aldndge," 37
among other sources. The Ristaino Court, through Justice Powell, re-
solved this seeming inconsistency: "While Aldridge was one factor rele-
vant to the constitutional decision in Ham, we did not rely directly on its
precedential force. . . .In light of our holding today, the actual result
in Aldi'dge should be recognized as an exercise of our supervisory power
over federal courts."'38
Both Ham and Ristaino differed from Aldridge in that they involved
30 283 U.S. 308.
31 The exchange between the trial judge and defense counsel was as follows:
MR. REILLY. At the last trial of this case I understand there was one woman on the
jury who was a southerner, and who said that the fact that the defendant was a negro
and the deceased a white man perhaps somewhat influenced her. I don't like to ask that
question in public but-
THE COURT. I don't think that would be a proper question, any more than to ask
whether they like an Irishman or a Scotchman.
MR. REILLY. But it was brought to our attention so prominently. It is a racial
question-
THE COURT. It was not this jury.
MR. REILLY. No, but it was a racial question, and the question came up-
THE COURT. I don't think that is proper.
MR. REILLY. Might I, out of an abundance of caution, note an exception.
THE COURT. Note an exception.
Id. at 310.
32 Id.
33 The Court listed, among others: Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837 (1891); Hill v.
State, 112 Miss. 260, 72 So. 1003 (1916). 283 U.S. at 311.
34 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
35 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
36 409 U.S. at 526.
37 Id. at 528.
38 424 U.S. at 598 n.10.
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state, not federal, trial courts. While Alddge set forth a supervisory rule
binding only the federal courts, Ham and Ristaino announced constitu-
tional standards to determine when a trial court must comply with a
minority defendant's request to have a question directed toward possible
racial prejudice posed during voir dire. The constitutional standards
establish the minimum protection afforded such a defendant, while the
states may opt to require further precautions, such as those the Supreme
Court requires in its supervisory role over the federal courts.39
In Ham . South Carolina,40 the Supreme Court held that the defend-
ant, a black man active in civil rights work, had a constitutional right to
an inquiry regarding racial prejudice during voir dire. Ham's defense at
trial was that law enforcement authorities were "out to get him" be-
cause he was well-known for civil rights activities, and that they framed
him on a charge of marijuana possession. 41 Prior to the voir dire, de-
fense counsel requested the court to ask the prospective jurors four ques-
tions, two of which concerned possible racial bias.42 The judge declined
to ask all four. Instead, he posed to the panel three general questions as
required by South Carolina statute.43 The Supreme Court declared
that the fourteenth amendment mandated the inquiries concerning ra-
cial prejudice since the amendment's principal purpose was to prevent
invidious discrimination against blacks, and also since the due process
clause assures essential fairness.44
The Court indicated subsequently in Ristaino v. Ross45 that the Ham
decision was to be construed narrowly. Since Ham argued that he had
been framed in retaliation for his civil right activities, "[r]acial issues
therefore were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial."'46
In contrast, the defendant in Ristaino was a black man accused of a vio-
lent crime against a white security guard. The Ristaino Court reasoned
that these facts were "less likely to distort the trial than were the special
39 Id. at 597 n.9.
40 409 U.S. 524.
41 Id. at 525.
42 The two questions concerning racial prejudice were:
"1. Would you fairly try this case on the basis of the evidence and disregarding the defend-
ant's race?
"2. You have no prejudice against negroes? Against black people? You would not be influ-
enced by the use of the term 'black'?"
The other two questions concerned prejudice against beards and pretrial publicity relat-
ing to the drug problem. Id. at 525 n.2.
43 S.C. CODE § 38-202 (1962). The questions, in substance, were: "1. Have you formed or
expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, Gene Ham? 2. Are you
conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against him? 3. Can you give the State and the
defendant a fair and impartial trial?" 409 U.S. at 526 n.3.
44 Id. at 526-27.
45 424 U.S. 589.
46 Id. at 597.
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factors involved in Ham," and thus the need to examine prospective ju-
rors about racial prejudice did not rise to constitutional dimensions. 47
Since Ristaino was a state case, it was not reversible error for the trial
court to refuse defendant's request to pose inquiries concerning racial
bias during voir dire.48
III. OPINIONS OF THE ROSALES-LOPEZ COURT
Justice White, writing for the plurality, relied on the Ham and Ris-
taino precedents in holding that the constitution did not require that
the Rosales-Lopez jurors be questioned about racial prejudice.
Only when there are more substantial indications of the likelihood of racial
or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular case does the trial
court's denial of a defendant's request to examine the jurors' ability to deal
impartially with this subject amount to an unconstitutional abuse of
discretion.49
Justice White found that Rosales-Lopez did not contain "special circum-
stances" of a constitutional dimension since there were no indications
that the trial would involve allegations of racial prejudice.50
Justice White next formulated a nonconstitutional standard to be
applied to federal courts through the Court's supervisory power. He
stated that the Court could not determine such a standard merely by
weighing costs and benefits. 51 More importantly, he reasoned, the stan-
dard should balance conflicting perceptions of justice.
On the one hand, requiring an inquiry in every case is likely to create the
impression 'that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation
of the skin [or] the accident of birth.' Ristaino,. . . at 596 n.8. ... Bal-
anced against this, however, is the criminal defendant's perception that
avoiding the inquiry does not eliminate the problem, and that his trial is
not the place in which to elevate appearance over reality.52
While Justice White observed that "it is usually best to allow the de-
fendant to resolve this conflict by making the determination of whether
or not he would prefer to have the inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice
pursued,153 he declared that "[flailure to honor his request . . .will
47 Id.
48 The Court added: "Although we hold that voir dire questioning directed to racial
prejudice was not constitutionally required, the wiser course generally is to propound appro-
priate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant. Under
our supervisory power we would have required as much of a federal court faced with the
circumstances here. See Aldridge v. United States ... " Id. at 597 n.9.
49 101 S. Ct. at 1635.
50 Id. at 1636.
51 "These are likely to be slight: some delay in the trial versus the occasional discovery of
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only be reversible error where the circumstances of the case indicate that
there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might
have influenced the jury. ' 54 He enunciated a two-part test of whether
the circumstances of a case would suggest a "reasonable possibility" of
racial prejudice: 1) Circumstances involving a violent crime between
members of different races carry such a "reasonable possibility."
2) Otherwise, a court may weigh the total circumstances to decide
whether a "reasonable possibility" exists. 55
Applying the two-part test, the plurality found that the circum-
stances of Rosales-Lopez created no "reasonable possibility" that racial or
ethnic prejudice might influence the jury. First, the case did not involve
a violent crime between members of different races; rather, the plurality
characterized the smuggling of aliens as a victimless, nonviolent crime. 56
Secondly, the total circumstances did not otherwise suggest such a "rea-
sonable possibility." Justice White considered the question regarding
attitudes toward aliens sufficient to remove those jurors who might have
harbored racial prejudice toward the defendant, 57 especially since the
trial judge also asked them generally why they could not sit as fair and
impartial jurors.58 He further discounted the likelihood that Mrs. Bow-
ling's testimony concerning the relationship between the defendant and
her daughter59 would exacerbate any latent racial antagonisms of the
jurors. "[T]he racial or ethnic differences between the defendant and a
key government witness did not create a situation meeting the ['reason-
able possibility'] standard .. .-60 since the three aliens and Falcon-
Zavala corroborated Mrs. Bowling's testimony. Thus, Justice White
54 Id. at 1635-36.
55 Justice White noted that since both the A/dlddge and Ristaino cases carried a "reasonable
possibility" that racial prejudice would affect the jury, they "imply that federal trial courts
must make such an inquiry when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and
where the defendant and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups." Id. at
1636. He added, "[t]here may be other circumstances which suggest the need for such an
inquiry, but the decision as to whether the total circumstances suggest a reasonable possibility
that racial or ethnic prejudice will affect the jury remains primarily with the trial court,
subject to case-by-case review by the appellate courts." Id.
56 Id.
57 "There can be no doubt that the jurors would have understood a question about aliens
to at least include Mexican aliens. The trial court excused two jurors for cause, based on their
responses to this question. Removing these jurors eliminated, we believe, any reasonable pos-
sibility that the remaining jurors would be influenced by an undisclosed racial prejudice to-
ward Mexicans that would have been disclosed by further questioning." Id.
58 "We also note that the trial court asked generally whether there were any grounds
which might occur to the jurors as to why they could not sit as 'fair and impartial' jurors.
Coupled with the question concerning aliens, there is little reason to believe that a juror who
did not answer this general question would have answered affirmatively a question directed
narrowly at racial prejudice." Id. at 1636 n.8.
59 See note I I supra.
60 101 S. Ct. at 1637.
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concluded that neither constitutional nor nonconstitutional standards
required voir dire on racial prejudice in Rosales-Lopez.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, concurred in the
plurality's result, but disagreed with the first half of the two-part "rea-
sonable possibility" standard. "In my view, it is inappropriate for us to
decide that there is always a 'reasonable possibility' of prejudice solely
because the crime is 'violent.' "61 He suggested that a trial judge could
well decide that such an inquiry might exacerbate any existing
prejudice without revealing that prejudice.6 2 Moreover, he predicted
that the plurality's opinion would spawn new litigation over the terms
"violent crime" and "different racial or ethnic groups. '63
In a strong dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Stevens relied upon Aldridge v. United Statesr4 and its application by fed-
eral courts over a period of fifty years to argue that existing law sup-
ported a per se rule.65 Such a rule would require all federal judges to
permit some sort of inquiry concerning possible racial or ethnic bias dur-
ing voir dire. While Aldridge itself involved "special circumstances," 66
Justice Stevens pointed out that neither the reasoning of Chief Justice
Hughes' opinion for the Court, nor the reasoning of the state court opin-
ions cited in Aldridge, relied upon such "special circumstances. '67 He
quoted the same passage of Aldridge referred to in the plurality opinion:
The argument is advanced on behalf of the Government that it would be
detrimental to the administration of the law in the courts of the United
States to allow questions to jurors as to racial or religious prejudices. We
think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that
persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as ju-
rors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were
barred. No surer way could be devised to bring the processes ofjustice into
61 Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 1637-38 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
63 Id. at 1637 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). "We cannot, in the nature of things, always lay
down 'bright line' rules, but we should try to avoid definitions that do not define or clarify
and hence invite litigation." Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
64 283 U.S. 308.
65 Justice Stevens noted: "For more than four decades, it has been the rule in federal
courts that a trial court must inquire as to possible racial bias of the veniremen when the
defendant is a member of a racial minority. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 ...
(1931)." United States v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923
(1974) (emphasis in original), noted in 101 S. Ct. 1629, 1638 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
.66 Justice Stevens uses the term "special circumstances" to refer to those which create a
"reasonable possibility" that racial prejudice may influence the jurors; they are to be distin-
guished from the "special circumstances" discussed in the plurality opinion, which trigger a
constitutional right to voir dire prospective jurors about possible ethnic or racial prejudice.
67 In a footnote, Justice Stevens referred to United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110, 1111-12
(4th Cir. 1970), which examined several of the state cases cited in Aldridge and found that they
contained no racial overtones whatsoever. 101 S. Ct. at 1641 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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disrepute.68
Justice Stevens, however, like the "overwhelming majority of Federal
Circuit Judges who have confronted the question presented in this case
...interpreted Aldridge as establishing a firm rule entitling a minority
defendant to some inquiry of prospective jurors on voir dire about possi-
ble racial or ethnic prejudice unrelated to the specific facts of the
case."
69
He criticized the plurality's "reasonable possibility" standard and
two-part test because the holding of Aldridge was not confined to its
facts, and thus did not require such a limited test. The two-part test,
like the voir dire in Rosales-Lopez, "wholly ignored the risk that potential
jurors in the Southern District of California might be prejudiced against
the defendant simply because he is a person of Mexican descent."' 70 Be-
cause a potential juror might harbor an irrational prejudice whenever a
criminal defendant is a member of a minority, Justice Stevens would not
require the evaluation of "special circumstances" to determine a "rea-
sonable possibility" of prejudice; he would instead grant such voir dire
requests on demand. He would thus give greater weight to a defense
counsel's perception of a risk of irrational prejudice than to the plural-
ity's fear that citizens might perceive that justice depends upon one's
race.
IV. ANALYSIS
The division of opinion within the Supreme Court in Rosales-Lopez
reflects the division of opinion generally over the efficacy of voir dire,
and of inquiries into racial prejudice in particular.7' The plurality has
created a two-part test for federal courts which requires such inquiries
only in circumstances which create a "reasonable possibility" that the
jury may be influenced by racial or ethnic bias. This formulation at-
tempts to prevent the presumption of racial prejudice in the federal
courtroom, and to prevent the accompanying loss of confidence in the
American criminal justice system. The concurring justices share the
same goals but would extend even greater discretion to a trial judge
68 101 S. Ct. at 1640 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.
308, 314-15).
69 101 S. Ct. at 1640 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 1641 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 In addition to the split among the Circuits over the per se rule, there is scholarly disa-
greement over the usefulness of voir dire in general, and in the context of racial prejudice in
particular. Broeder, for example, illustrates the difficulty of obtaining honest answers on voir
dire. See Broeder, supra note 28. See also Begam, Who Should Conduct Voir Dire? The attomrys, 61
JUDICATURE 71 (1977); Stanley, Who Should Conduct Voir Dire? Thejudge, 61 JUDICATURE 70
(1977); Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Eercise ofPeremptoy Chal-
lenges, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1493 (1975).
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presiding over a case that under the plurality's test would require voir
dire regarding racial prejudice. Conversely, the dissenting justices
would require all federal judges to permit voir dire concerning racial
bias, granting them discretion as to the form and extent of such ques-
tioning. While it does not directly address the plurality's concern that
such a per se rule might create a presumption of racial prejudice in the
courts, the dissenting opinion argues that not permitting voir dire into
possible racial prejudice might produce both a presumption and a real-
ity of racially prejudiced jurors.
The dissenting opinion takes a far better position on the issue than
do the plurality and concurring opinions. Not only does the dissent in-
terpret Aldridge more consistently than the plurality opinion, but it also
sets forth a simpler and more equitable standard than the plurality's
two-part rule. Most importantly, the dissent draws upon a persuasive
set of assumptions about voir dire on racial prejudice.
The most compelling distinction between the plurality opinion and
the dissenting opinion is the disagreement over possible sources of racial
or ethnic prejudice. The plurality opinion assumes that such prejudice
arises from or is exacerbated by the circumstances of the case. It sug-
gests that a trial court must weigh these sources-the nature of the
crime, the witnesses, the arguments-in order to gauge whether there is
a "reasonable possibility" that racial or ethnic prejudice may influence a
juror. The dissenting opinion, while recognizing that those factors may
exacerbate existing biases, assumes that biases are irrational and can be
held by any juror against any minority defendant regardless of the cir-
cumstances. As Justice Stevens aptly argued: "Even when there are no
'special circumstances' connected with an alleged criminal transaction
indicating an unusual risk of racial or other group bias, a member of the
Nazi Party should not be allowed to sit in judgment on a Jewish
defendant." 72
There is ample support for the dissent's assumption that pervasive
irrational prejudices persist among jurors, and that there is an accompa-
nying need for voir dire to uncover them. For example, the National
Jury Project found that
[t]he judgments that jurors make about the guilt or innocence of a defend-
ant are strongly influenced by the race of the defendant and key witnesses.
Despite legal and social changes of the last twenty-five years, most whites
still believe that blacks, chicanos, Native Americans, and other minorities
have lower moral character than whites, are more naturally prone to vio-
lence, and are held back in climbing the success ladder only by their own
lack of initiative.
Because most people learn to conceal these beliefs, even from them-
72 101 S. Ct. at 1638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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selves, voir dire on racial prejudice is very difficult. However, it must be
ventured because having several racists on a jury greatly increases the odds
of conviction for non-white defendants. 73
Courts and scholars have come to view racial prejudice as "one of those
'recognized classes' of prejudice for which 'there is a constant need for a
searching voir dire examination.' ,74
Because it places so much emphasis on the circumstances of a case
as the source of racial prejudices, the plurality relies heavily upon the
discretion of the trial court to prevent such prejudice. This reliance ef-
fectively discourages voir dire. Under the two-part rule, a trial judge
need not evaluate the risk that jurors may harbor prejudice against a
minority defendant simply because he is a minority member. A trial
judge may be uncomfortable about asking such questions, 75 even if he
recognizes that voir dire provides the only means for probing such
prejudice. He may also rationalize his refusal to probe by doubting
whether anyone would admit to racial prejudice if asked.76 A judge
may conceivably harbor racial prejudices of his own which may color
his consideration of all the circumstances. 77
73 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES 178 (1979).
74 United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Scholars have also
noted that
[c]ertain groups within our society have been subject to systematic and invidious
discrimination. The Supreme Court, in interpreting the equal protection clause, has rec-
ognized the existence of such 'stereotyped prejudice,' and has given a high degree of
scrutiny to governmental action affecting the victimized groups. In the trial context,
there is a danger that veniremen with stereotypical notions will not articulate or even be
fully aware of them. In order to maintain the integrity and impartiality of the trial
process, courts must be willing to allow defendants who can be perceived to be members
of groups victimized by systematic discrimination every opportunity to select jurors least
likely to be influenced by stereotypes.
Note, Voir Dire Limitations as a Means of Protecting Jurors' Safelp and Pn'vafy, 93 HARv. L. REV.
782, 791 (1980).
75 For example, the following exchange between defense counsel and the trial judge in
United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1978), typifies this reaction:
MR. BRADSHAW: And secondly, I forgot to include among my voir dire questions a
question concerning whether the fact that the defendant is a member of the Negro
race-
THE COURT: I am not going to ask that. I just feel that I-I may be unfair to you,
but I feel that would put undue emphasis on it. I have told them to weigh their own
conscience and I believe if they are racially prejudice[d] they ought to come forth and
say it; and if they are, they are not going to respond if I ask them. That is just the way I
feel about it. I understand your concern but I feel it is better for you.
la. at 972.
76 See text accompanying notes 79-80 infia.
77 An extremely blatant example of such prejudice caught the attention of Senator
Montoya:
Judge Gerald S. Chargin in the Superior Court of California on September 2, 1969, at
the sentencing of a 17-year-old juvenile defendant [remarked]:
'Mexican people, after thirteen years of age, think it is perfectly all right to go out
and act like an animal. . .. We ought to send you out of the country-send you back to
Mexico. You belong in prison for the rest of your life for doing things of this kind. You
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The dissent's per se rule would not only curb potential judicial
abuse of discretion but would also provide greater opportunities to un-
cover racial prejudice than pessimistic trial judges might think. A tact-
ful, probing voir dire may induce potential jurors to recognize and
admit racial prejudices. 78 While it is true that many jurors will refuse to
admit openly to harboring racial prejudices, a juror's use of language
and physical expression in responding to such an inquiry may provide
counsel with clues about the juror's racial attitudes.79 Counsel may then
exercise peremptory challenges more intelligently than he might in the
absence of such questioning.
In contrast, general questions will probably not extract any mean-
ingful responses about racial prejudices. As the Seventh Circuit
observed:
We disagree ... [with the government's] assumption that a general ques-
tion to the group whether there is any reason they could not be fair and
impartial can be relied on to produce a disclosure of any disqualifying
state of mind. We do not believe that a prospective juror is so alert to his
own prejudices. Thus it is essential to explore the backgrounds and atti-
tudes of the jurors. .... 0
If asked generally whether he is biased, a juror will probably not ac-
knowledge any prejudices, racial or otherwise. More specific question-
ing may reveal that the juror prefers not to live in the same
neighborhood as blacks, or believes that Mexicans have lower moral
ought to commit suicide. That's what I think of people of this kind. You are lower than
animals and haven't the right to live in organized society-just miserable, lousy, rotten
people. . . Maybe Hitler was right. The animals in our society probably ought to be
destroyed because they have no right to live among human beings.'
115 CONG. REc. 32358 (1969).
78 In United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980),
a case involving alleged narcotics trafficking by blacks,
[s]pecific questions concerning attitude toward blacks were addressed to each juror
as well. The court first asked what the prospective juror's 'general attitude toward
blacks' was; to further probe, the court then asked whether the prospective juror had ever
moved to a different area because he/she had been disturbed by changing conditions.
The court asked whether the prospective jurors had had any experience with persons of
other races, creeds, or colors resulting in civil or criminal confrontations, or whether
he/she had ever had any experiences with persons of different races arising out of em-
ployment, residence, or school situations, which might make the juror feel that he/she
could not fairly judge such persons. . . Several admitted that they had moved because
of 'changing conditions' in their neighborhoods. . . . Several admitted some prejudice
against blacks. . . . These were excused. Further, after the panel was sworn, and before
the alternates were selected, juror No. 5 told the court that he had been mugged on his
way home the previous night by a black person, and he admitted that he could no longer
be fair to black persons. . . . In sum, the court conducted a voir dire which resulted in
the selection of a panel whose background was fully explored, and whose state of mind
with respect to the racial 'question' was probed as well.
Id. at 136.
79 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 73, at 179.
80 United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1973).
1 RACIAL PREJUDICE ON VOIR DIRE
standards than do other ethnic groups. Thus, "[t]he voir dire in Ameri-
can trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate for
the exercise of peremptories, and the process of selecting a jury pro-
tracted. 81 An extensive voir dire may also provide a basis for chal-
lenges for cause.82
The plurality, on the other hand, reasoned that the trial court's
general questions, in addition to one question regarding aliens, ade-
quately explored possible racial prejudice against Rosales-Lopez. In
81 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1964).
82 For example, defense counsel in the trial of Huey Newton conducted a sufficiently ex-
tensive voir dire to support a challenge for cause with respect to a juror who refused initially
to admit any biases:
[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We are trying to give you an opportunity to speak so that
we will be able to tell whether there is [sic] some hidden crevices in your mind that may
be an interference in the proper evaluation of that case as the evidence unfolds. You
understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, it's a fact, is it not, that you already had an opinion before you came here
about this case?
A. Well, to a certain extent, yes.
Q. All right. Now, is your opinion that you had about this case before you got
here such that it would take the tremendous amount of evidence to overcome that opin-
ion?
A. No. It wouldn't. If-what evidence will show, that I will evaluate and see who
is right and who is wrong.
Q. It's not a question so much as to who is right and who is wrong. As you sit
there, ...in your opinion, right now while you are sitting there this minute, is Huey P.
Newton guilty or not guilty?
A. Well, I don't know for sure whether he shot the officer or not, but the officer is
dead.
Q. And by that same standard, just because the officer is dead, you are going to
say that Huey Newton did it; is that right?
A. Well, that's got to be proven.
Q. Well, my question is: As you sit there right now, do you believe that Huey
Newton shot and killed, stabbed, whatever it was, Officer Frey?
A. I don't know whether he shot him or not. That I can't say.
THE COURT: . . .you see, under our law there is a presumption of innocence to
start with. When you start the case the defendant is presumed to be innocent, and it is
up to the People, the prosecution, to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty. Do you understand that?
THE JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: So, now, not having heard any evidence, you must start with a pre-
sumption of innocence. Do you know what I mean by presumption? You must say, 'As
far as I know the man is innocent.' Do you understand that?
THE JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: 'And it is up to the prosecution to prove to me that he is guilty. Do
you understand that?
THE JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: So, therefore, as it stands right now, do you believe he is guilty before
you hear any evidence?. ..
THE JUROR: No ....
THE COURT: 'All right. Go ahead. ...
Q. Is there any evidence as far as you are concerned right now that Mr. Newton is
guilty of anything?
A. No.
Q. The fact that there has been a charge here, that is that he is charged with
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light of the foregoing, this is an unrealistic, albeit optimistic, appraisal.
Neither juror who was excused because of her response to the alien ques-
tion exhibited a racial prejudice against Mexicans, but rather a strong
predisposition concerning the crime of smuggling aliens.83 Hence, the
question probed attitudes toward the crime, not toward the defendant's
ethnicity. 84
On a practical level, trial judges could apply the per se rule much
more easily than the plurality's two-part "reasonable possibility" stan-
dard. The plurality admits that the second part of the standard---e.,
weighing the total circumstances-will involve case-by-case review. Jus-
tice Rehnquist points out that the first part of the standard also engen-
ders uncertainty because it offers "definitions that do not define or
clarify and hence invite litigation. ' 85 The "reasonable possibility" of
racial prejudice is likewise a definition that does not define. A trial
court judge weighing circumstances such as those in Rosales-Lopez might
murder, assault, and kidnapping, is that, as far as you are concerned, evidence that he is
guilty of anything?
A. No. That isn't evidence, no.
Q. As far as you are concerned, what is evidence?
A. What I am going to hear here in Court.
Q. Is that going to come from witnesses, as far as you are concerned?
A. From witnesses, yes ...
THE COURT: You may examine further, Mr. Garry.
BY MR. GARRY: . . . again I ask you that same question which you have answered
three times to me now-
THE COURT: No. Please ask the question without preface.
MR. GARRY: As Huey Newton sits here next to me now, in your opinion is he
absolutely innocent?
A. Yes.
Q. But you don't believe it, do you?
A. No.
THE COURT: Challenge is allowed.
MINIMIZING RACISM IN JURY TRIALS 90-94 (A. Ginger ed. 1969).
83 The question concerning aliens and the responses were as follows:
THE COURT: Now, this case, as I have already announced, involves aliens alleged to
be illegally in the United States. Do any of you have any feelings about the alien prob-
lem at all? Is there anything about it that would cause you to-yes ma'am?
JUROR ROSA: My name is Palos De La Rosa. It is just a name that they use for the
people to transport illegal aliens and to place them intentionally-
THE COURT: Very well. You may be excused. Would you return to the jury
lounge, please.
THE COURT: . . . Let me ask the general question: Do any of you have any partic-
ular feelings one way or the other about aliens or could you sit as a fair and impartial
juror if you are called upon to do so? In the back row?
JUROR SKELLY: Kristine Skelly, and I have mixed feelings about it. I don't think I
could be impartial. I have a tendency to feel-my own feelings, I don't think I could be
fair juror.
THE COURT: Very well, you will be excused. Would you return to the jury lounge,
please?"
Brief of the Petitioner at 4-5, Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1629 (1981).
84 There is no indication in the facts that Rosales-Lopez was an alien.
85 101 S. Ct. at 1637 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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determine that an immigration offense "reasonably" raises the possibil-
ity of racial prejudice. Taking a negligible amount of additional time86
to pose such questions during voir dire could save much more time by
eliminating numerous appeals for failure to ask.
Furthermore, a per se rule need not infringe unreasonably upon the
broad discretion of trial judges in conducting voir dire. The plurality
opinion cited Aldidge as authority for broad discretion,8 7 yet the result
in Aldidge removed a trial judge's discretion to refuse to ask voir dire
questions about racial prejudice. A per se rule would also leave intact
much of a trial judge's discretionary power: he would still be able to
conduct voir dire personally, and more importantly, he would be able to
formulate the questions. All that a per se rule would require is that
some inquiry about racial prejudice be made. The requirement would
also be limited to this particularly invidious and pervasive form of
prejudice, just as the Court has limited the "strict scrutiny" requirement
of equal protection analysis. In many instances, counsel may decide not
to probe racial prejudice because such a probe might exacerbate such
biases, 8 thus providing an inherent curb to unwise use of the per se rule.
In any case, the attorneys are in the best position to gauge the need for
such questioning as they have the strongest stake in deciding whether to
explore racial prejudice.
Finally, a per se rule would increase the confidence of citizens in the
fairness of the jury trial, rather than foster a damaging presumption of
racial prejudice, as the plurality opinion feared could result. A per se
rule would satisfy defendants and jurors alike that racial prejudice, as
well as other kinds of bias routinely probed during voir dire, would have
no place in court. As Chief Justice Hughes declared in Aldridge,
it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons en-
tertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and
that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred.
No surer way could be devised to bring the processes of justice into
disrepute.89
V. CONCLUSION
Rosales-Lopez v. United States articulated a new federal court supervi-
86 The voir dire in Rosales-Lopez lasted approximately six minutes. Brief of the Peti-
tioner at 5, Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1629 (1981). "The median estimated
duration for criminal case examinations was 52 minutes with oral participation [of counsel]
and 51 minutes without [e., by the judge alone]." Bermant, CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE
ExAMINATION: PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 14 n.20 (Federal
Judicial Center 1977).
87 101 S. Ct. at 1634.
88 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 73, at 179.
89 283 U.S. at 315.
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sory rule regarding voir dire on racial prejudice. The plurality opinion
subordinated a minority defendant's right to an impartial jury trial to
the plurality's concern for the appearances of justice in our federal
courts. By setting forth a narrow, two-part "reasonable possibility"
standard, the Court not only effectively discouraged trial courts from
posing questions about racial prejudice during voir dire, but it also
failed to provide adequate guidance to determine when such "reason-
able possibilities" of prejudice exist. The result of Rosales-Lopez may ef-
fectively damage the appearance of justice in federal court.
The dissenting opinion vigorously advocated a per se rule requiring
that inquiries about racial prejudice be made whenever a minority de-
fendant requested such voir dire. This per se rule would accurately fol-
low the Aldridge holding, without undermining the more recent decisions
in Ham and Ris/aino. The dissent's per se rule better reflects the need for
voir dire regarding racial prejudice, since all cases involving minority
defendants encompass the risk of purely irrational prejudice, unrelated
to the circumstances of a case. It also presents a more workable, equita-
ble standard.
The primary flaw of the plurality opinion, aside from the vague
standard it articulates, is its refusal to recognize the pervasive risk of
racial prejudice. A rule which leaves to the trial judge the decision of
whether to ask questions about racial prejudice reduces the opportuni-
ties for jurors to recognize and admit any racial biases. Thus, for com-
pelling ideological and pragmatic reasons, the Court should have
adopted the view shared by the dissenting justices and most circuit
court judges, and required all federal criminal courts to probe the possi-
bility of racial prejudice during voir dire if requested to do so by a mi-
nority defendant.
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